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Abstract: This paper seeks to examine the effect of employment protection on income 
inequality. By employing the employment protection data developed by Botero et al. (2004) 
as well as well established measures of economic inequality for a sample of 83 countries, our 
analysis suggests that increased employment protection is negatively associated with income 
inequality. This relationship remains highly robust across several different specifications and 
estimation methods. In addition, our analysis places the spotlight on the role of the informal 
economy and investigates how the presence of informal sector may affect the above 
mentioned relationship. Our results suggest that in the presence of a large unofficial economy 
the negative impact of employment protection on inequality is crucially mitigated and in some 
extreme cases may also be reversed.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent decades have seen a rise in income inequality, an aspect of which, apart from 
the labour share and unemployment rate, refers to changes in the distribution of 
earnings (Checci and Garcia-Penalosa, 2005). More unequal wages imply increased 
demand for social security as a mean to maintain the standards of living and reduce 
uncertainty.  
Government regulation in the labour market appears to be one prevalent policy to 
reduce the wage inequality (see e.g. Checci and Garcia-Penalosa, 2005; Piketty and 
Saez, 2006; Lemieux, 2008).  Rama (2001a, 2003) claims that labor institutions are 
supposed to increase redistribution and specifically shows that social security 
programs help reduce income inequality in a stronger way than collective bargaining 
do. Saint-Paul (1994) investigates the effect of minimum wages and finds that they 
have a small or even adverse impact on income distribution relative to other 
protection policies.1 According to Olson (1965), laws are shaped by the influence of 
interest groups which exert their power to redistribute income to themselves, 
increasing in this income inequality. 
In this paper, we seek to examine the effect of employment protection legislation 
(EPL) on income inequality.  Moreover, we investigate whether this relationship is 
affected by the magnitude of the informal sector within each country. To this end, we 
build a cross section dataset of 83 -developed and developing- countries where the 
dependent variable is income inequality and the key explanatory variable is 
alternative proxies of employment protection. In order to capture income inequality, 
we rely on two alternative inequality databases and we employ two alternative 
variables of income inequality. More precisely, we employ: (i) the Gini coefficient 
developed by the Texas University Inequality Project (2003) and (ii) the Gini 
coefficient developed by Solt (2009). Concerning the data on employment protection, 
we rely on the dataset developed by Botero et al. (2004). The basic advantage of the 
Botero et al. (2004) dataset is that it quantifies qualitative characteristics of the labour 
market’s legislation for 85 -developed and developing- countries and therefore allows 
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 Rama (2001b) provide empirical evidence that doubling of minimum wages in real terms in 
Indonesia, over the early 1990s, in a period with roughly elasticity of average wages to minimum 
wages associated with a mild decline in total wage employment and an increase in unemployment 
substantial in small establishments. 
us to investigate the impact of employment protection in countries that differ 
substantially in terms of economic development and institutional quality. 
Our results suggest that increased employment protection is negatively associated 
with income inequality. This relationship remains highly robust across several 
different specifications, data and estimation methods. Moreover, when we investigate 
the impact of unofficial economy on the above mentioned relationship, our analysis 
provide evidence that in the presence of a large unofficial economy the negative 
impact of employment protection on inequality is crucially mitigated and in some 
extreme cases may also be reversed.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows; in Section 2, we present the theoretical 
considerations upon which we base our empirical analysis on; in Section 3, we discuss 
the empirical methodology and the data; in Section 4 we present the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
2.1. The effect of employment protection legislation on income inequality 
The theoretical literature on labour market regulation and income inequality has 
been focused at the role the institutions and labour market policies (e.g. Emerson and 
Dramais, 1988; Rama, 2001a, 2003) such as the union coverage (e.g. Burniaux et al., 
2006; Checci and Garcia-Penalosa, 2005) and the setting of the minimum wage 
(DiNardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999; Dickens et al., 1999; Koeninger et al, 2007) , play in 
formatting the distribution of earnings. 
From a theoretical point of view, the effect of changing employment protection 
legislation (EPL) on income inequality is ambiguous. This is because the overall 
effect is dependent on two contrasting channels: (i) the effect of EPL on the 
employment rate and (ii) the effect of EPL on the earnings inequality among the entire 
working age population (i.e. inequality between workers and non-workers or between 
full time and part-time workers).   
The impact of changing EPL on the employment rate is difficult to be predicted 
theoretically since it depends crucially on the extent to which the extra cost can be 
shifted onto workers from employers. In addition, a decline in EPL may reduce the 
cost of employment adjustment (both hiring and firing) and as a result may lead to 
little change in the aggregate employment rate if both inflows to and outflows from 
employment tend to cancel each other out. A large number of empirical studies 
suggest that the effect of changing EPL has insignificant effect on employment rate 
(see e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 2006) whereas others, 
highlight a negative and highly significant effect of changing specific forms of EPL 
on the employment rate (see e.g. Nickell, 1997; Layard et al. , 1991; OECD, 2011).   
On the other hand, increased EPL tends to protect unskilled workers more than 
skilled workers due to a substantial fixed-cost component (Boeri et al., 2006). Thus, a 
weakening of employment protection, in particular the liberalisation of temporary 
contracts, is expected to contribute to higher wage inequality. Previous empirical 
studies examining the effect of EPL on the earnings inequality among the entire 
working age population  conclude that weakening of EPL leads to significantly higher 
earning inequality (see e.g. Koeninger et al., 2007; Visser and Cecchi, 2009; OECD, 
2011).  
Given that theoretical literature appears to be inconclusive concerning the overall 
effect of changing employment protection legislation (EPL) on income inequality, our 
analysis will proceed by placing the spotlight on the empirical aspects of this 
relationship and then “leave the data tell the story”. This will be done by estimating a 
standard inequality equation in which we employ as key explanatory variables various 
alternative employment protection legislation measures. Summarizing the above 
described theoretical considerations we conclude that stricter employment protection 
legislation (EPL) is expected to exert a positive impact on income inequality when the 
effect of EPL on wages dispersion prevails, whereas is expected to exert a negative 
impact when the corresponding effect on the unemployment rate appears to be larger.  
 
2.2. The impact of the informal sector on employment protection-income inequality 
nexus. 
A substantial part of the economic activity, in both developing and developed 
countries, takes place in the informal sector.2 The existence of unofficial economy 
generates malfunctions in the operation of the markets and distorts crucially the 
results of implemented policies (see e.g. Cuff et al., 2011; Almeida and Carneiro; 
2007). In this paper, we focus on the relationship between employment protection 
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 Based on recent estimates of Schneider et al. (2010) informal economic activity –in most developing 
countries-exceeds the 50% of the total economic activity. 
legislation and income inequality and we seek to examine how the existence of 
informal sector within an economy may affect the above mentioned relationship.  
The consequences of EPL on labour market outcomes are a constant source of 
controversy in the literature. As a result of increased protection, formal jobs become 
more expensive for the firms and this generates an incentive for the entrepreneurs to 
move to the informal sector (see e.g. Cuff et al., 2011; Dabla-Norris et al, 2008). The 
contraction of demand for labour in the formal sector and the corresponding increase 
in demand in the informal sector affects both the wage dispersion and the employment 
in the formal sector and therefore is expected also to affect the overall effect of EPL 
on income inequality.3 Since the overall effect is dependent on several theoretical 
assumptions concerning the structure of the labour market as well as the form of 
labour demand on the formal and the informal sector, we choose to proceed by 
focusing on the empirical aspects of this relationship and by testing whether (and 
how) the above relationship is indeed affected by the presence of unofficial economy 
within a country.  
Summarizing the above described theoretical considerations we conclude that: the 
existence of unofficial economy affects both the wage dispersion and the employment 
in the formal sector and therefore is expected to affect the overall effect of EPL on 
income inequality. 
 
3. Empirical Model and Data 
3.1 Econometric Model 
 
The empirical model used to study the relationship employment protection and 
inequality is as follows: 
 
0 1   i i k i i iInequality EmplProt controls geographical dummies uα β β= + + + +   (1) 
 
where income inequality in country i, is expressed as a function of employment 
protection, a set of control variables, geographical dummies and a stochastic term ui. 
To estimate Eq. (1) we build a cross section dataset of 83 –developed and developing- 
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 Another strand of the literature underlines the importance of increased enforcement of mandated 
benefits on the willingness to be employed on the formal sector and therefore to labour supply in the 
formal sector (see e.g. Harris and Todaro, 1970; Fields 1975; Almeida and Carneiro, 2007).  
countries. The dependent and explanatory variables are discussed below. Explicit 
definitions, descriptive statistics and sources for the variables employed are provided 
in Appendices A and B.   
 
3.2. The data 
 
3.2.1  Inequality  measures 
In order to capture income inequality, we rely on two alternative inequality 
databases and we employ two alternative proxies of income inequality. More 
precisely, we employ: (i) the Gini coefficient developed by the Texas University 
Inequality Project (2003) (denoted as Tex_Gini) and (ii) the Gini coefficient 
developed by Solt (2009) (denoted as Gini_Solt). Note that Tex_Gini is average over 
the period 1990-2002 whereas Gini_Solt is average over the period 1990-2005.  
The Texas Gini coefficient measures the industrial wage inequality, its source of data 
is the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) and covers the years from 1970 
to 2002. It is based on manufacturing wage information compiled by UNIDO and is 
available for 156 countries. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an 
index of 100 implies perfect inequality.  However, when focusing on a greater 
coverage across countries and over time using this dataset we have to pay the cost of a 
reduced comparability across observations. The Gini coefficient developed by Solt 
(2009) refers to the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) and 
overcomes this limitation.4 The SWIID provides comparable Gini indices of gross and 
net income inequality for 153 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to 
the present along with estimates of uncertainty in these statistics.  
 
3.2.2  Employment Protection Legislation measures 
In order to control for employment protection, we rely on the dataset developed 
by Botero et al. (2004). The basic advantage of the Botero et al. (2004) dataset is that 
it quantifies qualitative characteristics of the labour market’s legislation for 85 
different countries. The measures of labour regulation deal with three broad areas: (i) 
employment laws, (ii) collective relations laws and (iii) social security laws.  
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 It standardizes the United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database and other 
inequality data while minimizing reliance on problematic assumptions by using as much information as 
possible from proximate years within the same country; having the data collected by the Luxembourg 
Income Study as the standard. (Solt, 2009) 
In this study we focus exclusively on the “Employment Laws” area and we 
examine how the employment protection legislation affects income inequality.5 More 
precisely, we employ the general employment laws index developed by Botero et al. 
(2004) (denoted as labour_index) as key explanatory variable. We also employ the 
four sub-indices of labour_index summarizing different dimensions of such 
protection. Specifically, we employ: (i) the alternative employment contracts index 
(denoted as altern_contract) which measures the existence and cost of alternatives to 
the standard employment contract, (ii) the cost of increasing hours worked index 
(denoted as cost_overtimen) which measures the cost of increasing the number of 
hours worked, (iii) the cost of firing workers (cost_firing) which measures the cist of 
firing the 20 percent of the firm’s workers and (iv) the dismissal procedures measure 
(index_dism) which measures the worker protection granted by law or mandatory 
collective agreements against dismissal.6  
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
To ensure robust econometric identification, we use a number of control 
variables in the estimated equations. Our set of controls follows the empirical 
literature on income distribution (see e.g. Dreher and Gaston, 2006; Barro and Lee, 
2000). More precisely, we include the level of GDP per capita (denoted as gdppercap) 
as a handy proxy for structural determinants correlated with levels of income, the 
government spending as a share of GDP (denoted as govspend) that includes all 
government consumption, investment but excludes transfer payments made by the 
state. In addition we include the primary school enrolment (primschool) as a share of 
the population of official primary education age, the secondary school enrolment 
(secschool) as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age and 
the tertiary school enrolment (tertschool) as a percentage of  the population of official 
tertiary education age. Finally, we control for the effects of international market 
integration by including the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (denoted as 
openness). Note that all data are obtained from the World Development Indicators 
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 The Botero et al. (2004) dataset contains also data related to the “Collective or industrial relations 
laws” that regulate the bargaining, adoption and enforcement of collective agreements, the organization 
of trade unions and the industrial action by workers and employers as well as data related to the  
“Social security laws” that contemplate the social response to quality-of-life conditions and 
requirements. 
6
 For more details about the methodology employed by Botero et al. (2004) in order to construct these 
variables see Appendix A. For Summary Statistics of these variables see Appendix B. 
Database (2010) and that our explanatory variables are averages over the period 1980-
2004.  
 
4. Estimation and Results 
 
In the following subsections we discuss the results obtained by working as above. 
These are reported in Tables 1 to 5.  
 
4.1 Testing the effect of employment protection on income inequality 
 
We start by estimating equation (1) presented in section 3.1, using the data and the 
empirical methodology outlined in the previous section. The results are reported in 
Table 1.  
 
[Table 1, here] 
 
In columns (1) to (4), Table 1, Tex_Gini is regressed on index_labour as well as on a 
set of control variables (i.e. gdppercap, publspend, primschool, secschool, tertschool, 
openness).  Note that we present t-statistics based on clustered standard errors. As can 
be seen, index_labour enters with a negative and highly significant coefficient which 
remains virtually unchanged in all four alternative specifications. This result indicates 
the negative effect of increased employment protection on income inequality. This 
finding appears to be in accordance with the theoretical priors driven from the 
literature which concludes that stricter employment protection laws increase 
employers’ costs to hire  or dismiss workers and raise the reservation wage of the 
unemployed, eventually compressing the wage differential7 (OECD, 2011)  and that 
employment protection is significantly associated with the evolution of wage 
inequality, as a reduction of employment protection by one standard deviation is 
associated with a 19-20% higher wage differential (Koeninger et al., 2007).8  
As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, we observe that 
all of them bear the expected -by the theory- sign. Specifically, gdppercap enters with 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient which remains intact to all 
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 Under the hypothesis that the associated labour adjustment costs are relatively more important for 
unskilled workers. 
8
 A simulation that calculates the percentage increase in the 90-10 differential which is correlated with 
one standard-deviation reduction in rigidity. 
alternative specifications. This finding reflects the tendency of a negative relationship 
between income inequality and GDP per capita. In addition, govspend bears a 
negative and highly significant coefficient in most of the specifications. This result is 
in accordance with previous studies and policy reports indicating that larger 
government spending tends to be associated with lower levels of income inequality 
(see e.g. Barr, 1992; Mahler and Jesuit, 2006; OECD, 2008). Finally, the coefficient 
of primschool is positive and significant at a level of 95 percent highlighting the 
positive impact of primary schooling on income inequality. This puzzling -at a first 
glance- result could be explained if we take into account the large number of 
developing countries in our sample. Since in most of these countries a large part of the 
population is totally illiterate, increased primary schooling widens the income gap 
between educated and totally illiterate population. On the other hand, secschool, 
tertschooland and openness appear to be non significant in most of the specifications.  
In columns (5) to (8), Table 1, Gini_Solt is regressed on index_labour as well 
as on the same set of control variables. As can be verified, index_labour enters again 
with a negative coefficient which remains significant at a level of 99 percent in all the 
alternative specifications. Our finding suggests that the negative effect of increased 
employment protection on income inequality is robust to alternative income inequality 
measures. Moreover, our findings concerning the rest of the explanatory variables 
remain qualitatively intact.  
 
[Table 2, here] 
 
In Table 2, we inquire into the robustness of our baseline results by investigating 
whether the negative impact of increased employment protection on income 
inequality survives under alternative specifications and estimation techniques. To this 
end, in columns (2) and (6) we re-estimate our “benchmark” equations presented in 
columns (1) and (4) respectively by excluding the 10 percent of the outliers from our 
sample. This allows us to investigate whether our findings are driven by some outlier 
observations.9 In turn, in columns (3) and (7) we proceed by estimating the basic 
equations without the set of geographical dummies. This allows us to examine 
whether the inclusion of geographical dummies lie behind our empirical findings.  
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 We assume that our “benchmark” equations are those presented in columns (1) and (4) of Table 2 
which are identical to those reported in columns (4) and (8) of Table 1.  
As can be easily verified, index_labour bears a negative and significant coefficient 
in all the specifications highlighting that the negative effect of increased employment 
protection on income inequality remains highly robust to several alternative 
specifications. As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, our 
empirical findings remain qualitatively intact. 
Finally, in columns (4) and (8) we seek to tackle the potential reverse causality 
problem between employment protection and income inequality. Reverse causality 
may arise because higher income inequality provokes people to ask for more 
employment protection. According to this rationale, the direction of the causality may 
goes from income inequality to employment protection and not the other way round. 
In order to manage this, in columns (4) and (8) we employ an instrumental variables 
approach. Particularly, we use as instruments for employment protection: (i) the level 
of democracy (denoted as democracy), (ii) the political orientation the chief executive 
and the largest party in congress (denoted as left_center_orient) and (iii) a dummy 
capturing whether an economy is characterized by a common law legal system 
(denoted as legor_uk).  
Our choice concerning the set of instruments employed has been based on 
empirical studies examining the determinants of labour regulations (see e.g. Botero et 
al., 2004). According to Botero et al. (2004), labour regulation across countries can be 
explained by: (i) efficiency considerations, (ii) political power theories, and (iii) legal 
theories. Efficiency theory focuses on a choice of a combination of regulations by an 
efficiency criterion (Demsetz, 1967; North, 1981). In this case government uses a set 
of labour market interventions to maximize social welfare by curing market failures. 
According to political power theories, institutions are designed to transfer resources 
from those out of political power to those in power (Olson, 1993). Concerning labour 
market, regulations protecting workers are introduced by socialist, social-democratic, 
and more generally leftist governments to benefit their political constituencies (Hicks, 
1999). Legal theories suggest that the enforcement of the labour regulations is 
provided by the legal traditions of each country (Djankov et al., 2003b). In accordance 
with that, common law countries that tend to rely on markets and contracts should 
regulate labour market less.10 Finally, dictatorships are less constrained than 
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 Common law emerged in England and is mostly characterized by the importance of decisionmaking 
by juries, independent judges, and judicial discretion as opposed to codes. Common law was 
transmitted to the British colonies, including Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
democratically elected governments, and therefore will have more redistributive laws 
and institutions. Constitutions, legislative constraints, and other forms of checks and 
balances are all conducive to fewer regulations (Djankov et al., 2002). 
Estimation method is two-stage least squares (2SLS) with geographical dummies 
and robust standard errors. First stage results are reported in the upper part of columns 
(4) and (8) whereas the results of the second stage are reported below. As can be 
verified our results concerning employment protection remain qualitatively identical 
to those presented in other columns. Moreover, we note that we have performed a 
Hausman test in order to compare the 2SLS with the simple OLS model. The 
Hausman test showed that there are no systematic differences between the two models 
and therefore we can proceed by keeping the simple OLS model as a basis in our 
analysis.11  
 
           [Table 3, here] 
 
In Table 3, instead of the general employment protection variable 
index_labour, we employ interchangeably the four sub-indices of employment 
protection described in detail in Section 3.2.2. More precisely, in column (1) Tex_Gini 
is regressed on the dismissal procedures measure (index_dism) as well as on the 
standard set of controls following identical empirical methodology to that employed 
in Table1, whereas in columns (2) to (4) we include interchangeably the cost of 
increasing hours worked index (cost_overtimen) [column (2)], the cost of firing 
workers (cost_firing) [column (3)] and the alternative employment contracts index 
(altern_contract) [column (4)]. As can be easily verified, index_dism and 
cost_overtimen bear negative and highly significant coefficients whereas the 
coefficient on cost_firing although negative appears to be marginally insignificant. On 
the other hand,  altern_contract enters with a positive coefficient which is significant 
at a level of 90 percent.  
These empirical findings suggest that the negative impact of increased 
employment protection on income inequality verified in Table 1, is mainly driven by 
the employment protection legislation related to the dismissal procedures and the cost 
                                                                                                                                            
United States, and a number of countries in the Caribbean, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. (Djankov 
et al, 2003) 
11
 The results obtained from the Hausman test are available upon request. 
of increasing hours worked. As far as the rest of the controls are concerned, we 
observe that our results remain similar to those presented in Table 1. Both gdppercap 
and govspend enter again with a negative and significant coefficient in most of the 
specifications. The only remarkable difference is that in Table 3 the primschool loses 
its significance and tertschool bears a negative and highly significant coefficient in all 
the specifications.  
 
4.2 Examining the effect of informal sector on employment protection-income 
inequality nexus. 
The existence of unofficial economy generates several malfunctions in the operation 
of the markets and distorts the results of implemented policies (see e.g. Cuff et al., 
2011; Almeida and Carneiro; 2007). 
 A branch of the literature focuses on the effects of increased protection on the 
demand for labour in the formal sector (see e.g.  Cuff et al., 2011; Dabla-Norris et al., 
2008). According to this rationale formal jobs become more expensive for the firms 
and this generates an incentive for the entrepreneurs to move to the informal sector. 
The contraction of demand for labour in the formal sector and the corresponding 
increase in demand in the informal sector affects both the wage dispersion and the 
employment in the formal sector and therefore is also expected to affect the overall 
effect of EPL on income inequality. Concerning the labour supply side,  Harris and 
Todaro (1970),  Fields (1975) and Almeida and Carneiro (2007) underline the 
importance of increased enforcement of mandated benefits to the willingness to be 
employed in the formal sector and therefore to labour supply in the formal.  
To determine whether the size of the informal sector affects the relationship 
between EPL and income inequality we follow the strategy of Dutt and Mitra (2002). 
Namely; we introduce in our basic specification interaction terms in order to examine 
whether the size of the shadow economy affects the impact of employment protection 
on income inequality. More precisely, we introduce the multiplicative variable 
index_labour*shadow where shadow is the size of the informal economy measure 
developed by Schneider et al. (2010). Shadow measures the size of the informal 
economy as a share of GDP and -in our sample- ranges from a minimum value of 0.08 
(in the case of Switzerland) to a maximum of 0.67 (in the case of Bolivia).12  
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 According to Schneider et al. (2010) shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of 
goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities in order to avoid: 1) payment 
By introducing these interaction terms we allow the effect of index_labour to vary 
across countries characterized by different sizes of the informal sector. According to 
our theoretical priors, the coefficient of the interaction term has to be positive and 
significant. Moreover, standard calculus tells us that the turning point in the data is 
given by the coefficient of index_labour divided by the coefficient of the interaction 
term index_labour*shadow. This method allows us to examine first whether a change 
in the sign of  index_labour indeed exists and also to determine it endogenously.  
 
[Table 4, here] 
 
The results of this experiment are presented on Table 4. In columns (1) to (4) 
Tex_Gini is regressed on index_labour, index_labour*shadow and as well as on the 
standard set of controls whereas in columns (5) to (8) we follow the same strategy by 
employing Gini_Solt as dependent variable. As can be easily verified, the coefficient 
of index_labour*shadow is positive and significant in all of the specifications. These 
findings are in line with the implications driven by our theoretical priors. Namely; in 
countries characterized by large informal sector the negative effect of increased 
employment protection on income inequality is mitigated and in some cases may also 
be reversed.  
What do these finding suggest about the effect of employment protection on 
income inequality in the real world? Focusing on the estimation presented in Column 
(4) of Table 4 we can calculate the estimated turning point on the effect of 
employment protection which is a value of shadow around 0.62.13 As can easily be 
verified this value is very close to the maximum value of shadow in our sample which 
equals to 0.67. Therefore, we conclude that in the real world the turning point for the 
coefficient of index_labour is rarely met. However, our empirical findings suggest 
that the size of informal economy does play a crucial role on the magnitude of the 
effect of employment protection on income inequality. Specifically, in countries 
characterized by small informal sectors the negative effect of employment protection 
on inequality is larger whereas in countries characterized by large informal sectors 
this effect is crucially mitigated and- in some extreme cases- even reversed.  
                                                                                                                                            
of income, value added or other taxes, 2) payment of social security contributions and 3) having to 
meet certain legal labour market standards. 
13
 The turning point in the data is given by the coefficient of index_labour divided by the coefficient of 
the interaction term index_labour*shadow. 
 [Table 5, here] 
 
In Table 5, we replicate the same experiment for the four sub-indices of 
employment protection (i.e. index_dism, cost_overtimen, cost_firing, 
altern_contract). Specifically, we construct four alternative interaction terms (one for 
each specific sub-component of employment protection) and then we regress 
Tex_Gini and Gini_Solt on the employment protection sub-indices as well as their 
corresponding interaction terms following identical estimation methodology to that 
employed in Table 4. As can be easily verified, all alternative interaction terms enter 
with a positive and significant coefficient in most of the specifications. These results 
are in line with the key message of Table 4. Namely, in countries characterized by 
large informal sector the negative effect of increased employment protection on 
income inequality is mitigated and in some cases may also be reversed. 
What is more important with the empirical findings reported in Table 5, is that the 
predicted turning point on the effect of specific sub-categories of employment 
protection on income inequality, can be met in the real world. That is, our model 
suggests that in the presence of large informal sector, specific forms of employment 
protection may exert a positive impact on income inequality. This is the case -for 
example- for cost_overtime and firing_cost. Focusing on the estimation presented in 
column (2) we can calculate the estimated turning point on the effect of the cost of 
increasing hours worked index (cost_overtimen) which is a value of shadow around 
0.5. Similarly, based on the results reported in columns (3) and (7), the estimated 
turning point on the effect of the cost of firing workers (firing_cost) is a value of 
shadow around 0.35-0.45. A value of shadow around 0.45 appears to be highly 
realistic for our group of countries. Thus, our model suggests that specific forms of 
employment protection may have a positive impact on income inequality, in countries 
characterized by large unofficial economies.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
One of the questions we tried to address in this paper was whether employment 
protection legislation is an efficient way of narrowing the gap between the rich and 
the unfortunate ones. By employing employment protection data developed by Botero 
et al. (2004), along with two different measures of income inequality for a sample of 
83 developed and developing countries, we concluded that employment protection 
legislation has a negative impact on income inequality. This relationship remained 
highly robust across several different specifications and estimation methods. 
Furthermore, our analysis proceeded with investigating how that relationship is 
affected by the extent of the informal economy. Our results suggested that in the 
presence of a large unofficial economy the negative effect of employment protection 
legislation on inequality is crucially mitigated and in some extreme cases may also be 
reversed. 
 
  
 
 
Table 1: The Effect of Employment Protection on Income Inequality 
 
 
Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.   
 
 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt 
index_labour -4.895** -7.012*** -7.221*** -6.732*** -16.831*** -14.346*** -12.578*** -13.915*** 
 (-2.159) (-3.001) (-3.092) (-2.727) (-4.324) (-3.686) (-3.107) (-3.592) 
gdppercap -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (-6.528) (-4.754) (-2.880) (-2.965) (-6.507) (-3.936) (-2.407) (-3.555) 
govspend  -0.232*** -0.206*** -0.181***  -0.363*** -0.316*** -0.230*** 
  (-5.549) (-4.996) (-3.410)  (-4.610) (-4.117) (-2.866) 
pimschool   0.098*** 0.088**   0.205*** 0.206*** 
   (2.999) (2.588)   (2.793) (2.774) 
secschool   -0.039* -0.028   -0.065 -0.108 
   (-1.865) (-0.900)   (-1.295) (-1.537) 
tertschool    -0.015    0.159 
    (-0.264)    (1.492) 
openness    -0.017    -0.043 
    (-0.692)    (-1.374) 
Geographical 
Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
obs 70 65 64 64 83 77 76 76 
R2 0.53 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.47 0.58 0.66 0.68 
  
 
Table 2: The Effect of Employment Protection on Income Inequality [Sensitivity Analysis] 
 
 
Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.  3). In Equations (2) and (6)  we exclude 10 per cent 
of the outliers from the sample 4) Equations (3) and (7) is estimated without geographical dummies. 5)  Equations (4) and (8) are estimated using two-stage least squares 
(2SLS). First stage results are reported in the upper part of each column, whereas the results of the second stage are presented below.
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt 
    First Stage Results    First Stage Results 
left_center_orient    0.121*    0.067 
    (1.91)    (1.21) 
democracy    -0.006    -0.006 
    (-1.02)    (-1.38) 
legor_uk    -0.174***    -0.187*** 
    (-3.26)    (-3.95) 
    Second Stage Results    Second Stage Results 
index_labour -6.732*** -7.301*** -6.038** -11.598* -13.915*** -13.130*** -11.152*** -28.965*** 
 (-2.727) (-2.885) (-2.334) (-1.935) (-3.592) (-3.239) (-2.697) (-3.063) 
gdppercap -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-2.965) (-3.272) (-3.792) (-2.547) (-3.555) (-3.149) (-3.436) (-2.879) 
govspend -0.181*** -0.184*** -0.091 -0.189*** -0.230*** -0.238*** -0.117 -0.222** 
 (-3.410) (-3.283) (-1.485) (-2.882) (-2.866) (-2.790) (-1.562) (-2.138) 
pimschool 0.088** 0.076** 0.076* 0.100** 0.206*** 0.265*** 0.153* 0.268*** 
 (2.588) (2.128) (1.920) (2.205) (2.774) (3.952) (1.972) (4.227) 
secschool -0.028 -0.027 -0.040 -0.029 -0.108 -0.148** -0.134** -0.110* 
 (-0.900) (-0.851) (-1.290) (-0.859) (-1.537) (-2.509) (-2.156) (-1.852) 
tertschool -0.015 -0.013 -0.022 0.011 0.159 0.194* 0.053 0.238** 
 (-0.264) (-0.220) (-0.554) (0.165) (1.492) (1.951) (0.611) (2.091) 
openness -0.017 -0.036 -0.032 -0.012 -0.043 -0.056 -0.070** -0.031 
 (-0.692) (-1.294) (-1.335) (-0.562) (-1.374) (-1.551) (-2.218) (-0.868) 
Geographical 
Dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no yes 
obs 64 60 64 64 76 69 76 74 
R2 0.71 0.72 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.69 0.60 0.64 
  
Table 3: The Effect of Employment Protection on Income Inequality 
 
 
Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.   
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt 
index_dism -4.187***    -8.317***    
 (-3.213)    (-3.196)    
cost_overtime  -3.721***    -7.507***   
  (-2.761)    (-3.892)   
firing_cost   -3.992    -2.967  
   (-1.560)    (-0.659)  
altern_contract    5.613*    6.306 
    (1.716)    (1.422) 
gdppercap -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* 
 (-2.892) (-2.303) (-2.684) (-1.863) (-3.628) (-2.363) (-3.072) (-2.488) 
govspend 0.081** 0.078** 0.075** 0.043 0.209*** 0.191*** 0.211*** 0.201*** 
 (2.460) (2.532) (2.470) (1.246) (2.919) (2.687) (3.001) (2.976) 
pimschool -0.031 -0.025 -0.018 -0.013 -0.107 -0.106 -0.110 -0.103 
 (-1.003) (-0.810) (-0.593) (-0.461) (-1.593) (-1.511) (-1.497) (-1.433) 
secschool -0.039 -0.014 -0.049 -0.095* 0.104 0.159 0.090 0.040 
 (-0.691) (-0.216) (-0.825) (-1.694) (1.025) (1.519) (0.867) (0.401) 
tertschool -0.183*** -0.174*** -0.186*** -0.177*** -0.210*** -0.240*** -0.213** -0.213*** 
 (-3.313) (-3.315) (-3.462) (-3.185) (-2.944) (-2.782) (-2.494) (-2.659) 
openness -0.025 -0.004 -0.023 -0.018 -0.065** -0.010 -0.050 -0.040 
 (-1.063) (-0.174) (-0.937) (-0.784) (-2.092) (-0.311) (-1.447) (-1.180) 
Geographical Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
obs 64 64 64 64 76 76 76 76 
R2 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.64 0.64 
  
 
Table 4: The Effect of shadow economy on income inequality, employment protection nexus. 
 
 
Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt 
index_labour -18.292*** -11.286*** -10.997*** -10.681*** -33.394*** -22.149*** -21.587*** -20.660*** 
 (-5.183) (-3.496) (-4.016) (-3.798) (-6.392) (-4.269) (-4.685) (-4.307) 
index_labour*shadow 43.047*** 15.768* 14.394* 16.894** 52.377*** 26.020* 31.489** 26.397* 
 (5.754) (1.716) (1.765) (2.458) (4.724) (1.699) (2.376) (1.984) 
gdppercap  -0.001** -0.001 -0.001  -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 
  (-2.623) (-1.554) (-1.364)  (-1.887) (-0.483) (-1.234) 
govspend  -0.208*** -0.184*** -0.169***  -0.315*** -0.248*** -0.198** 
  (-5.585) (-4.613) (-3.264)  (-3.748) (-2.874) (-2.303) 
pimschool   0.092*** 0.079**   0.219*** 0.214*** 
   (2.987) (2.547)   (2.901) (2.808) 
secschool   -0.040* -0.016   -0.082 -0.097 
   (-1.916) (-0.567)   (-1.580) (-1.429) 
tertschool    -0.061    0.078 
    (-1.182)    (0.863) 
openness    -0.014    -0.034 
    (-0.605)    (-1.192) 
Geographical Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
obs 70 65 64 64 83 77 76 76 
R2 0.50 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.46 0.60 0.69 0.70 
Table 5: The Effect of shadow economy on income inequality, employment protection nexus 
 
 
Notes: 1). t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. 2). *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.   
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Tex_Gini Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt Gini_Solt 
index_dism -8.837***    -16.965***    
 (-3.506)    (-4.100)    
index_dism*shadow 13.153**    25.050**    
 (2.331)    (2.491)    
cost_overtime  -7.373***    -9.818***   
  (-2.821)    (-3.673)   
cost_overtime*shadow  14.324*    7.973   
  (1.934)    (0.986)   
firing_cost   -8.391**    -10.636*  
   (-2.413)    (-1.670)  
firing_cost*shadow   16.641**    31.844**  
   (2.530)    (2.250)  
altern_contract    1.510    -3.275 
    (0.408)    (-0.590) 
altern_contract*shadow    12.364***    28.347*** 
    (3.150)    (2.766) 
gdppercap -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.927) (-0.975) (-1.549) (-0.837) (-2.003) (-1.386) (-1.125) (-0.237) 
govspend 0.076** 0.077** 0.067** 0.037 0.214*** 0.198*** 0.216*** 0.203*** 
 (2.388) (2.645) (2.493) (1.039) (2.890) (2.698) (2.999) (2.914) 
pimschool -0.025 -0.020 -0.002 -0.003 -0.100 -0.105 -0.086 -0.086 
 (-0.861) (-0.705) (-0.086) (-0.098) (-1.556) (-1.499) (-1.219) (-1.218) 
secschool -0.064 -0.048 -0.094* -0.126** 0.042 0.136 -0.004 -0.039 
 (-1.215) (-0.834) (-1.737) (-2.172) (0.480) (1.275) (-0.049) (-0.425) 
tertschool -0.171*** -0.169*** -0.176*** -0.168*** -0.166** -0.233** -0.174** -0.186** 
 (-3.099) (-3.400) (-3.341) (-3.110) (-2.139) (-2.613) (-2.010) (-2.306) 
openness -0.023 -0.003 -0.018 -0.016 -0.061** -0.006 -0.039 -0.033 
 (-1.019) (-0.131) (-0.792) (-0.726) (-2.127) (-0.200) (-1.224) (-1.036) 
Geographical Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
obs 64 64 64 64 76 76 76 76 
R2 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.68 
Appendix A: Variable descriptions 
 
Variables Description of variables Source 
Tex_Gini Gini coefficient developed by Texas University Inequality Project (2003) Texas University Inequality 
Project (2003) 
Gini_Solt Gini coefficient developed by Solt (2009) 
 
Solt (2009) 
index_labour Employment laws index; Measures the protection of labour and employment laws as the average 
of (1) Alternative employment contracts, (2) Cost of increasing hours worked, (3) Cost of firing 
workers and (4) Dismissal procedures.  
Botero et al. (2004) 
index_dism Dismissal procedures index; Measures worker protection granted by law or mandatory collective 
agreements against dismissal. It is the average of the following seven dummy variables which 
equal one: (1) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing more than one worker, 
(2) if the employer needs the approval of a third party prior to dismissing more than one worker, 
(3) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing one redundant worker, (4) if the 
employer needs the approval of a third party to dismiss one redundant worker, (5) if the employer 
must provide relocation or retraining alternatives for redundant employees prior to dismissal, (6) if 
there are priority rules applying to dismissal or lay-offs, and (7) if there are priority rules applying 
to re-employment 
Botero et al. (2004) 
firing_cost Cost of firing workers; Measures the cost of firing 20 percent of the firm’s workers (10% are 
fired for redundancy and 10% without cause). The cost of firing a worker is calculated as the sum 
of the notice period, severance pay, and any mandatory penalties established by law or mandatory 
collective agreements for a worker with three years of tenure with the firm. If dismissal is illegal, 
we set the cost of firing equal to the annual wage. The new wage bill incorporates the normal 
wage of the remaining workers and the cost of firing workers.  The cost of firing workers is 
computed as the ratio of the new wage bill to the old one. 
Botero et al. (2004) 
altern_contract Alternative employment contracts; Measures the existence and cost of alternatives to the standard 
employment contract, computed as the average of: (1) a dummy variable equal to one if part-time 
workers enjoy the mandatory benefits of full-time workers; (2) a dummy variable equal to one if 
terminating part-time workers is at least as costly as terminating full time workers; (3) a dummy 
variable equal to one if fixed-term contracts are only allowed for fixed-term tasks; and (4) the 
normalized maximum duration of fixed-term contracts. 
Botero et al. (2004) 
cost_overtime Cost of increasing hours worked; It measures of the cost of increasing the number of hours 
worked are used by calculating the "maximum number of hours of work in a year before 
overtime" per year in each country (excluding overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.).  A firm first 
increases the number of hours worked until it reaches the country’s maximum normal hours of 
work, and then uses overtime. If existing employees are not allowed to increase the hours worked, 
Botero et al. (2004) 
perhaps because overtime is capped, Botero et al assume the firm doubles its workforce, doubling 
the wage bill of the firm.  The cost of increasing hours worked is computed as the ratio of the final 
wage bill to the initial one 
openness Trade openness; the ratio of country's total trade, the sum of exports plus imports, to the 
country's gross domestic product, for the years 1980-2004. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (2010) 
govspend Government spending; the level of government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, for the years 
1980-2004. 
 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (2010) 
primschool Primary school enrollment as a percentage of the population of official primary education age. World Bank Development 
Indicators (2010) 
secschool Secondary school enrollment as a percentage of the population of official secondary education 
age. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators (2010) 
tertschool Tertiary school enrollment as a percentage of the population of official tertiary education age. World Bank Development 
Indicators (2010) 
ddppercap GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) World Bank Development 
Indicators (2010) 
shadow Shadow Economy as a share of GDP 
 
Schneider et al (2010) 
democracy Polity Democracy Index 
 
Polity IV (2004) Database 
left_center_orient Chief executive and largest party in congress have left or center political orientation 
 
Botero et al. (2004) 
legor_uk British Legal Origin La Porta et al. (2008) 
 
Appendix B: Summary Statistics 
 
The means, standard errors, minimum observations, and maximum observations for 
the variables are summarized in the following table:  
 
Variables Observations Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
Tex_Gini 70 41.35 5.606 28.48 53.27 
Gini_Solt 83 37.91 9.480 22.50 61.57 
index_labour 83 0.48 0.193 0.14 0.82 
index_dism 83 0.43 0.281 0.00 0.85 
firing_cost 83 0.46 0.211 0.00 1.00 
altern_contract 83 0.60 0.187 0.00 0.96 
cost_overtime 83 0.45 0.435 0.00 1.00 
openness 83 58.19 40.302 15.07 293.33 
govspend 77 28.96 10.685 8.77 56.38 
primschool 82 99.69 15.306 33.63 138.61 
secschool 82 72.43 30.919 5.04 149.73 
tertschool 82 25.81 17.711 0.42 79.28 
gdppercap 83 7251.535 8973.196 141.34 32321.34 
shadow 83 0.31 0. 146 0. 08 0.67 
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